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These tenets were first described in The Coordinated Framework 
for Regulation of Biotechnology, published by the President’s 
Domestic Policy Council Working Group on Biotechnology 
through the OSTP in 1986.4 Questions such as how far the law 
should extend into biotechnology and where exactly the line is 
drawn continues to spark controversial debate. Is it ethical to 
select the sex of your child? Is it going too far to engineer crops to 
house vital vitamins that would not be found in their natural state? 
Biotechnology is a valuable scientific advancement. It is involved 
in the development of new medicines, therapies, and research 
tools, increasing crop yields, as well as improving the taste, texture 
and nutritional value of certain foods.5 Yet, the fundamental ques-
tion remains the same; what is okay to modify and what is not. Is 
it alright to genetically alter embryos so that they are free from all 
types of health risks, or is that setting a dangerous precedent?
 
Many biotechnology companies are protesting the government’s 
interference due to the setbacks all the regulations can cause. 
Other parties such as those in the legal profession, policy makers, 
and even the general public are saying that the government does 
not have enough commanding control in biotechnology. They 
are demanding contingencies like the clear labeling of genetically 
modified foods or the complete eradication of cloning individuals.
 
Where the ethical line is drawn will have to be determined by 
future generations, as they will be the ones to witness the long 
term effects of biotechnology. Biotechnology has made impressive 
waves in society today, and it will continue to be a practice that 
creates dialogue as well as leads innovation. 
Every day, society’s technological advancements sur-pass what humanity could have only dreamt about in the past. Today’s world features genetically modified foods that encompass vaccinations, predetermined sexual selection of  children, and cloning mechanisms. 
All aforementioned are components of  the possibilities of  biotech-
nology. However, despite the scientific and societal advancements 
of  biotechnology, the practice is extremely controversial due to the 
lack of  legal precedent.
Biotechnology is the use of living systems and organisms to 
develop or make products.1 Since biotechnology is a modern 
phenomenon, the laws and ideas surrounding the concept are 
still fairly undetermined. The unclear boundaries are exacerbated 
by the fact that biotechnology includes a broad range of fields - 
pharmaceutical, agricultural, environmental, and so forth- and 
the majority of biotechnologies take several years to formulate 
from start to finish.  However, there is a standard law concerning 
biotechnology that holds for all the differing fields. 
The Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
is the U.S. government’s formal policy for biotechnology and its 
resulting applications. It was enacted by the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) in 1986 under President Ronald Reagan 
and implemented by the Department of Agriculture (DOA), the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).2 Inside the framework, each federal 
agency has adopted its own principles dealing with biotechnology 
regulation, but the Coordinated Framework is the set universal 
standard as of now. 
The law outlines the basic federal policy for regulating the devel-
opment and introduction of products to ensure the safety of the 
general public. It has three tenets. First, U.S. policy will focus on 
the product of genetic modification (GM) techniques, not the 
process itself. Secondly, only regulation grounded in verifiable 
scientific risks will be allowed. Lastly, GM products are on a con-
tinuum with existing products and, therefore, existing statutes are 
sufficient to review the products.3 
By Lola Adeosun, CAS ‘18
Biotechnology: 
Scientific Progress or Slippery Slope?
“Since biotechnology is a modern 
phenomenon, the laws and ideas 
surrounding the concept are still 
fairly undetermined. ”
1“Biotechnology.” Agriculture for Impact. July 1, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2016.
2“Biotechnology Law.” HG.Org Legal Resources. Accessed March 28, 2016. 
3Ibid
4Ibid
5Koehler, Gus A. “III) REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY.” Library.ca.gov. April 1996. 



















I In 2008, the 17 year old Samantha Elauf, an American Muslim citizen, was denied a job at Abercrombie & Fitch stores because her dress code was not adequate to the “classic East Coast collegiate style” adopted by the store. When interviewed for the position, Elauf  wore her hijab, a representation of  the 
Muslim faith, which was not mentioned by her or the interviewer 
during the application process. The headscarf, however, caused 
the district manager to lower her score in the appearance section, 
since covered heads are not considered part of  the store’s style, 
disqualifying her from the position. She claimed she was prevented 
to work at the store because they refused to allow her to have her 
head covered, even if  for religious reasons, Elauf  contacted the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), who sued 
Abercrombie and Fitch on her behalf  for religious discrimination. 
The EEOC brought suit for a violation of  the Title VII of  the Civil 
Rights Act of  1964,1 which prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees on the basis of  sex, race, color, national origin, 
and religion. 
In response to the suit against the company, Abercrombie argued 
that the employers had no reason to believe Elauf followed 
the Muslim faith since the applicant did not mention the “reli-
gious motivations behind her fashion decisions” and, therefore, 
her rejection was not related to religious discrimination. One 
of the company’s spokeswoman, Carlene Benz, argued that 
Abercrombie’s dressing policy has become less strict and has been 
allowing workers to be more individualistic, in addition to provid-
ing religious accommodations when requested. The Court had to 
decide whether or not an employer could be held responsible for 
discrimination, even if the employee had said nothing about the 
necessity of an accommodation.2  
In 2015, after accepting the U.S. Supreme Court decision in favor 
of the EEOC and paying $25,670 in damages to Elauf and $18,983 
in court costs, Abercrombie & Fitch was granted the request to 
dismiss its appeal of the suit by the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.3 According to Justice Scalia, the decision of the Court, 
which had a majority opinion of 8-1 for the EEOC, was easy. The 
Court held that the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states 
that an employee cannot be refused a work position for any of the 
It’s Not About Fashion
By Ana Amatuzzi, CAS ‘18
discriminatory reasons, and if the employee can prove the denial 
occurred on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and 
religion, the suit should be valid. Furthermore, the Court affirmed 
Title VII, mandating that employers offer such accommodations.  
The only member of the Court which voted against the EEOC, 
partially agreed with the suit, but said that Elauf and the EEOC 
could not prove the discrimination was intentional.4 According to 
Justice Clearance Thomas, Abercrombie was only applying their 
neutral Look Policy, a guide of what employees should look like 
in order to represent the store, and, since the reason could not be 
proved to be discrimination, Title VII was not violated. In his 
opinion, the Look Policy, even though it affects people who wear 
religious garb disproportionally more, treats all candidates in the 
same manner. Moreover, Justice Thomas also argued that the stat-
utory language should be used more carefully in order to punish 
only employers who intentionally discriminate against job applicants. 
The case not only answered several questions about Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but also raised awareness for discrim-
ination. The retail world has been long criticized for imposing 
beauty and fashion models, especially as those patterns are used 
to justify discrimination. It is clear that no individual, being a 
job applicant or not, should be discriminated against, and Look 
Policies should be revised in order to guarantee equal treatment 
to all citizens. In this way, Elauf and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission accomplished much more than a success-
ful suit, they were able to establish the discriminatory trend of fashion.
1“Civil Rights Act 1964”, Title VII 
2Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 575 U.S. ___ 
(2015)
3EEOC “Abercrombie Resolves Religious Discrimination Case Following Supreme Court Ruling 
in Favor of EEOC” http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-28-15.cfm (accessed March 
2, 2016)
4Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 575 U.S. ___ 
(2015)
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Unlike most legal systems in the world, the English legal profession is split between barristers and solic-itors. Today, there is an ongoing debate in England concerning whether the two categories presently in their legal profession should be fused in the future 
or not. Although barristers and solicitors are both lawyers, they are 
different types of  lawyers and the professional training that they are 
required to undertake differs as well. The primary role of  barristers 
is to work as advocates in the courts, while solicitors are responsible 
for all the legal work that is done outside of  court, such as meeting 
with clients and drafting letters.1 The division between barristers 
and solicitors has been in place for hundreds of  years; however, the 
legal profession has changed considerably in England over the years.
On one side of the debate are those who argue that the English 
legal profession should not be fused in the future because there 
are several disadvantages to the present formation. First, if the 
profession were fused, the high standard of advocacy would be lost. 
According to James Tumbridge, a barrister in England, “Advocacy 
is a skill that requires practice simply not available in a fused pro-
fession, which is why the English Bar remains the envy of so many 
jurisdictions.”2 It is crucial to maintain high advocacy standards in 
court so that barristers will argue cases to the best of their abil-
ity. Only the highest standard of advocacy will ensure that cases 
are presented clearly and that justice is served. Most importantly, 
barristers are expert advocates. Becoming a barrister in England is 
incredibly difficult. An aspiring barrister must obtain an undergrad-
uate degree in law (LLB), or an undergraduate degree in a different 
subject; however, this must be followed by the conversion course.3 
The student then joins one of the Inns of Court and takes the Bar 
Practice Training Course, and once he or she is ‘called to the Bar’ 
by his or her Inn of Court, the final stage to becoming a practicing 
barrister consists of the student undertaking a pupillage.4 Thus, the 
long process demonstrates that the specialization and expertise of 
barristers have been acquired through many long years of studying 
and training. Fusion would undermine the high standard of advo-
cacy and expertise of barristers, which solicitors do not have.
 Fusion would further lead to the loss of the ‘cab rank’ rule, which 
is a significant mechanism used in the English legal profession. 
Under this rule, barristers are obligated to accept a case that is 
“within their knowledge and expertise provided they are free to 
do so, no matter how unpalatable the case.”5 The ‘cab rank’ rule 
is important to have because it prevents barristers from discrim-
inating against individuals when selecting a case based on their 
race, gender, or disability. Thus, people cannot be denied repre-
sentation in court. Finally, under the current division, clients have 
the option of obtaining a second opinion. A second opinion must 
be obtained to bring objectivity to a case.6 For instance, a second 
opinion is needed to make sure that the interpretation or opinion 
of a solicitor was not biased under any circumstances. In conclu-
sion, the division must be preserved because there would be more 
discrimination in the English legal profession without the ‘cab rank’ 
rule, and second opinions are necessary to have in order to ensure 
fairness and impartiality, eliminating any possible bias from arising. 
Despite these arguments, proponents of a fused legal profession 
claim that the division has already begun to break down, and 
that the system is actually becoming more fused over the last few 
years due to legal reforms. First of all, the role of the barrister as 
a “referral” profession has changed because members of the public 
may now instruct a barrister directly, without the need to instruct 
a solicitor first.7 Members of the bar are now also able to “conduct 
litigation,” a job that has been reserved for solicitors traditionally.8 
Thus, this demonstrates that the fundamental distinction between 
a barrister as a specialist advocate and a solicitor as one who 
prepares cases outside of court is true only to a certain extent as 
a result of these changes that have occurred, which have blurred 
the division of the English legal profession. Finally, many solici-
tors now have the ability to conduct advocacy in the higher courts 
(Crown Court, High Court, Court of Appeal, and the Supreme 
Court), a right that has been reserved for barristers only in the 
past. This can be done through satisfying the Higher Rights of 
Audience (HRA) qualification, which allows solicitors to represent 
their clients in the higher courts as “solicitor-advocates”.9 The 
Higher Rights of Audience (HRA) qualification further demon-
strates that fusion is already occurring as a result of these changes 
that have taken place in the last few years. It is important to note 
that opponents of the current division also emphasize that a fused 
profession would lead to a reduction in costs for clients, since a 
person would no longer have to pay two lawyers for the work that 
could be performed by one lawyer. 
Currently, the English legal profession continues to be split 
between two branches: barristers and solicitors. Many people 
believe that it does not make sense to change a system that has 
functioned well for hundreds of years, claiming that there are 
various advantages to having a separated profession such as the 
high standard of advocacy and barristers’ expertise. Fusion would 
further lead to the loss of the ‘cab rank’ rule and second opinions, 
which are important mechanisms to ensure equality and fairness in 
the legal system. However, despite the advantages of a split profes-
sion, the distinction between barristers and solicitors has become 
increasingly blurred. Not only are barristers now allowed to take 
instructions directly from the public, but also solicitors have now 
gained rights of audience in the higher courts. Nevertheless, the 
question still remains: what does the future hold for the English 
legal profession?
Is It Time for a Fused Legal Profession 
in England? By Aleksandra Boots, CAS ‘17
 1“Solicitors and Barristers – Two Sides of the Same Coin,” Stowe Family 
Law, accessed February 27, 2016, http://www.marilynstowe.co.uk/2013/10/03/
solicitors-and-barristers-two-sides-of-the-same-coin-by-john-bolch/.
2James Tumbridge, “The Split Profession,” February 2003.
3Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System (London: Routledge, 2015), 648-49.
4Ibid
5“Removal of the ‘Cab Rank’ Rule a Major Threat to Justice,” Bar Standards Board, February 
27, 2016.
6“Barristers and Solicitors,” Sixth Form Law, February 26, 2016.
7“Time for a Fused Legal Profession,” Bargat Murray, accessed February 27, 2016.
8Ibid.



















Antitrust and Google Search  
With the emergence of  “big business” in the late 1800s, governments enacted antitrust laws and, consequently, federal and state regulation. Today, however, antitrust laws have entered a new domain with the rise of  the Internet and 
e-commerce. In particular, the European Commission has recently 
filed charges against Google. The European Union’s antitrust chief, 
Margrethe Vestager, has “highlighted how the region’s authorities 
believe that Google has abused its dominance in web searches to 
benefit some of  its own services.”1 This has promoted further anal-
ysis of  the workings of  Google Search, and has sparked a debate 
about the competing interests of  business, specifically on online 
platforms, and consumer protection. 
The situation with Google is not novel. Applying antitrust 
laws to innovative and technologically advanced companies in 
“dynamic markets has always been a perilous proposition, and 
despite advances in economics and jurisprudence, it remains so.”2 
Successful firms like Google, with their strong reliance on intellec-
tual property rights, are especially likely to be problematic targets.3 
As such, it is no surprise that many believe that at least some of 
Google’s practices and patterns are suspect under antitrust law, 
particularly Google’s use of tying tactics. Tying refers to a seller 
refusing to provide one product (the “tying” product) unless the 
buyer also takes another (“tied”) product.4 Specifically, using 
Google Search yields algorithmic results alongside sponsored/
paid results, often with links to Google’s related services, such as 
Google Flights, Google Images, or Google Maps. Thus, Google’s 
related services derive economic benefits from tied promotions 
with Google’s own search engine. As Google Search users are 
unable to choose whether or not they would like to receive Google 
related services in their search results, this act falls closely in line 
with tying and is, therefore, suspect to antitrust laws.5
On the other hand, many people believe that Google’s practices 
are valid, and well within the confines of existing antitrust laws, 
especially in consideration of the ever-evolving standards for 
online business platforms. While Google does participate in paid/
sponsored search results, it reveals them amongst organic search 
results only with certain rules and regulations in mind. When a 
user enters a query into Google Search, Google's search engine 
evaluates webpage content and produces a list of the pages most 
relevant to the user’s particular query. Amongst the query results, 
Google also displays sponsored links, from which Google earns 
money on a pay-per-click basis. However, these links are only 
generated by keywords that a user enters into the search engine. 
Google Search uses highly specialized algorithms to ensure 
that only the most relevant results are presented, even amongst 
sponsored links, and that these results are ranked in order of most 
to least relevant.6 Ultimately, Google Search employs innovative 
methods to ensure that its users truly get qualified search results, 
despite deriving large amounts of revenue from its sponsored links.
Deciding whether or not Google, and like-minded companies, 
follow or violate antitrust laws is not a black or white decision. As 
one of the leading technology companies of the modern era, and 
with over one hundred billion searches every year, Google has a 
responsibility to protect its user/consumer base, even if it involves 
restricting its own capabilities. Determining whether Google 
carries this responsibility or not is a gray area until explicit anti-
trust laws and court decisions for such rapidly developing online 
platforms are developed. Until such a time, the task of ensuring 
consumer protection for emerging technologies should be shared 
between large corporations and consumers themselves. 
By Anonymous
1Scott, Mark. "Google Rebuts Europe on Antitrust Charges." The New York Times. August 
27, 2015. Accessed February 28, 2016.
2Manne, Geoffrey A.; Wright, Joshua D. “Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case 
against the Case against Google.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 34.1 (2011): 
171-244.
3Ibid.
4Franklin M. Fisher, Innovation and Monopoly Leveraging, Dynamic Competition and Public 
Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues 139 (Jerry Ellig ed. 2001)
5Edelman, Benjamin G., Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and 
Bundling? (May 12, 2014). Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (June 
2015): 365-400.
6Manne, Geoffrey A.; Wright, Joshua D. “Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case 




















Recently the Major League Baseball (MLB) Draft has included a serious subject of  debate in regard to international athletes. The year 2014 best depicted the issue at hand. That year Rusney Castillo- who was a former member of  the Cuban national team and at 
the time considered one of  the best baseball prospects in the world- 
defected from Cuba. Castillo proceeded to avoid the MLB draft 
and sign a seven-year, $72.5 million contract with the Boston Red 
Sox.1  That same year Masahiro Tanaka- a former five-time Nippon 
Professional Baseball League all-star pitcher in Japan- avoided the 
MLB draft as well and signed a seven-year, $155 million contract 
with the New York Yankees.2  Regardless of  Castillo and Tanaka’s 
prior successes they had no Major League Baseball experience. 
Therefore, Castillo and Tanaka would be considered MLB rookies 
if  they were able to reach the MLB level that season. To further 
clarify, had Castillo and Tanaka been international basketball pros-
pects they would have been forced to enter the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) draft and sign with their drafter.
During the 2014 MLB draft Carlos Rodon- considered one of 
the best pitching prospects in the United States at the time- was 
drafted third overall by the Chicago White Sox.3  Like Castillo and 
Tanaka, Rodon would be considered an MLB rookie if he were to 
reach the MLB. However, Rodon’s contract, which consisted of 
a $6.58 million signing bonus4 - the largest for a draftee that year- 
and a base salary of $463,1285,  was worth significantly less than 
Castillo and Tanaka’s. Furthermore, draftees such as Rodon were 
expected to earn salaries similar to their base salaries for their first 
few seasons due to MLB draft rules.6  Unfortunately, discrepancies 
such as these have been seen throughout  MLB in recent years. 
One cannot help but believe that Rodon was subjected to discrimi-
nation on the basis of origin.
How could a system in which potential, international MLB rookies 
have the opportunity to sign contracts that are astronomical in 
comparison to those offered to draftees ever come into existence? 
Furthermore, why would an American such as Rodon- who was a 
potential MLB all-star- agree to a base salary of only $463,128?
Some industry insiders strongly believe that an international MLB 
draft would be impossible to implement.7  Jayson Stark, an ESPN 
writer, presented an argument that if the MLB were to make the 
draft international, foreign legislators from countries such as 
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela could try to block the 
MLB from forcing their athletes into a draft because of financial 
benefits.8 Financial benefits include: MLB built baseball facilities, 
professional support for aspiring athletes, and eventual large sums 
of money to be paid to these athletes. Stark also noted that an 
international draft for rookies could deter many talented athletes 
from countries not currently subject to it.9
 
Aspiring professional baseball players from the United States, 
U.S. territories, and Canada agree to enter the draft because it 
is the only way for them to join an MLB team.10  The downside 
of entering the draft is that the draftees are only allowed to sign 
with the team that drafted them, as opposed to being able to field 
offers from multiple teams.11  Furthermore, most draftees are not 
allowed to sign MLB contracts immediately.12  Thus, draftees are 
left with a clear disadvantage. 
In contrast, most aspiring athletes from Japan make it to the MLB 
through the posting system.13  The posting system allows for MLB 
teams to match a fee of up to $20 million to an athlete’s Japanese 
club in order to negotiate a contract with the athlete- as agreed 
upon by the MLB and Nippon Professional Baseball League in 
2013.14  In the case of Masahiro Tanaka, the Yankees paid the 
Tohuku Rakuten Golden Eagles $20 million and Masahiro Tanaka 
was able to negotiate an enormous MLB contract immediately. 15 
Most Cuban defectors such as Rusney Castillo have the freedom 
to sign with any MLB team for an uncapped amount of money. 
These facts potentially justify a claim that the MLB draft dis-
criminates against draftees on the basis of national origin, which 
is a clear violation of Tittle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16  
Draftees are not only subjected to lesser salaries, unlike certain 
international athletes presented, but they also do not have the 
freedom to sign with any team. Unfortunately, for American and 
Canadian citizens the MLB draft presents the only opportunity to 
potentially become a part of the MLB, as of the present, there is 
no way of getting around the draft.2
1Browne, Ian. “Red Sox Sign Cuban Star Outfielder Rusney Castillo.” Major League Baseball. 
August 23, 2014. Accessed February 23, 2016.
2Hoch, Bryan. “Masahiro Tanaka Signs Seven-year, $155 Million Contract with New York 
Yankees.” Major League Baseball. January 23, 2014. Accessed February 23, 2016.
3“2014 Draft: Signing/Bonus Tracker.” Major League Baseball. July 18, 2014. Accessed 
February 23, 2016.
4Ibid.
5WASIL. “Carlos Rodon Salary, Net worth Chicago White Sox (RELIEF PITCHER).” Celebrity 
Glory. May 2015. Accessed March 20, 2016.
6“Signing A Professional Baseball Contract.” Yougoprobaseball.com. Accessed March 20, 2016.
7Stark, Jayson. “International MLB Draft: Inevitable or Impossible?” ESPN. June 11, 2015. 
Accessed February 23, 2016.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10“First-Year Player Draft Rules.” Major League Baseball. Accessed February 23, 2016.
11Ibid.
12OKennedy, Patrick. “MLB Draft 2015: What Happens after a Player Is Selected.” Bless You 
Boys. June 08, 2015. Accessed February 23, 2016.
13MLB, NPB Reach Agreement on Posting System.” Major League Baseball. December 16, 
2013. Accessed March 01, 2016.
14Ibid.
15Hoch, Bryan. “Masahiro Tanaka Signs Seven-year, $155 Million Contract with New York 
Yankees.”
16“Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241
Sources
By Bradley Ferber, CAS ‘17
The MLB Draft: 



















th 2016 Donald Trump stated, 
“Remember, I’m self-funding my campaign. Very 
important… They’ve put up millions and millions 
of  dollars in these PACs and those PACs control 
the candidates… Carson is controlled by his PAC, 
Bush is controlled by his PAC, Rubio is controlled by his PAC.”1 
Statements like this are par for the course when it comes to the 
increasingly vitriolic rhetoric surrounding campaign finance in the 
2016 presidential election. Though Trump has become notorious 
for grandiose claims like this one, one does have to wonder about 
the corrupting influence a system of quid pro quo fueled by special 
interest groups might have on American politics. That being said, 
if one views campaign contributions as a form of free speech, then 
how could the government legally put a cap on it?
The law surrounding modern campaign finance finds its origins in 
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. The FECA 
served to check the campaign contributions a candidate could 
receive while running for either Congress or the Presidency by 
regulating “the size of contributions to political campaigns, the 
source of such contributions, public disclosure of campaign finan-
cial information, and public financing of presidential campaigns.”2 
The Constitutional basis for the FECA is predicated upon Article 
I Section IV in which the federal government is given the right 
to control the “time, place, and manner”3 of federal elections. 
Nevertheless, the legal debate over campaign contributions was 
only just beginning.
Three years following the passage of the FECA, the Supreme 
Court case Buckley v. Valeo raised the question of whether or 
not placing limits on campaign expenditures violated the first 
amendment right of free speech4. In a per curiam opinion, the 
court decided that FECA’s regulation of contributions to political 
candidates and campaigns protected the “integrity of our system 
of representative democracy” by acting as a safeguard against 
“unscrupulous practices”.5 
The court also found that restrictions on self-funding a political 
campaign was in violation of the first amendment under the asser-
tion that such practices do not represent a threat to the integrity 
of the electoral process as individual donations to candidates 
might. The precedent Buckley v. Valeo has set for the 2016 presiden-
tial election is noteworthy because it gives an apparent leg up for 
candidates like Trump who have no limit on how much of their 
personal wealth they can contribute to their campaigns.
Still, the problem of soft money or “money raised for political 
activities in favor of or opposed to a certain candidate or issue that 
stops short of actually endorsing anything”6 yet continues to be 
litigated. With the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA) and the McCain-Feingold Act of 2002, however, several 
provisions were put in place to end the use of nonfederal or soft 
money contributions.  Specifically, the laws “limit the amount of 
soft money that can be given to a political party and how much 
money can be spent on advertising”.7 As big of a step the BCRA 
was in taking money out of politics, the argument that money acts 
as a form of free speech reemerged ten years later in Citizens United 
v. FEC.
The case arose when Citizen United’s film Hillary: The Movie was 
blocked by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) under the 
assertions that it acted as a form political advertisement, and was 
therefore in violation of the BCRA. Similar to the case of Buckley 
v. Valeo, the Supreme Court found in a 5 to 4 vote that “under 
the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political 
broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited”.8 As such, 
corporate interests found their way back into the political arena.
While the Supreme Court has had the ostensible goal of making 
elections more democratic by limiting campaign contributions as 
seen with the FECA and the BCRA, its allowance of self-funding 
(Buckley v. Valeo9) and soft money donations (Citizens United v. 
FEC10) acts as tacit approval of money in politics. If campaigns 
were to be publicly funded, inherent advantages of the wealthiest 
candidates as well as a system of quid pro quo might be limited. 
Thus, for the 2016 presidential election, money may still be the 
name of the game.
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In 2012 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) deter-mined that several power plants throughout the Midwest had violated the Clean Air Act (CAA) of  1963 by releasing large amounts of  toxic compounds containing mercury and other heavy metals into the air around populated areas. The 
EPA then imposed compensatory fines on the polluters totaling in 
excess of  $9.6 billion. Last year, year 20 state governments and their 
industry allies challenged the EPA’s decision to impose regulatory 
fines on the emissions of  power plants in the case Michigan et al. v. 
The Environmental Protection Agency.1 
The legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the 
EPA had violated the Clean Air Act by imposing fines without 
considering the economic costs both to private corporations and 
to the public? The fines in question caused certain states to sue 
because they believed that the total economic cost would outweigh 
the environmental or health benefits from regulation.2 According 
to provisions added to the Clean Air Act in 1990, the EPA has the 
ability to regulate and fine producers of toxic emissions such as 
power plants, foundries, etc. where “appropriate and necessary”3 
Naturally, the meaning of what is “appropriate and necessary” can 
be nebulous at best and in the case in question, ultimately it will be 
left to the will of the courts. However, the decision in Michigan v. 
EPA, placed a limit on the EPA’s power and gave a more concrete 
description to the “appropriate and necessary” clause of the CAA.4 
The EPA now can only impose regulatory fines after running a 
cost benefit analysis and determine that the fines will create a 
larger economic benefit than burden.5 Thus, the power of the EPA 
to impose regulatory fines was not removed in this case, but it was 
severely weakened.
The origins of this case are based on the precedent set by Chevron 
v. NRDC (1984) where the EPA was given the regulatory power to 
impose fines and regulate industry as long as it did not break any 
civil statues while doing so.6 In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Clarence Thomas stated that “Although precedent established that 
the courts grant agencies a great deal of deference when agencies 
interpret statutes that Congress left ambiguous, such deference 
might result in court allowing an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power.”7 Essentially, this meant that Justice Thomas 
believed that the EPA overstepped its bounds in imposing too 
harsh sanctions. 
But, the question in this case is an inherently subjective one. All of 
the justices agreed that the EPA should impose restrictions when 
the benefits outweighed the costs; they disagreed however, on 
what the benefits of the regulation are.
 Also of note is the vague language that appeared in the CAA. The 
words “appropriate and necessary” do not specify certain limits 
to which polluters must adhere, but instead place the burden of 
deciding on what is “appropriate and necessary” on the EPA and 
then the courts. The plaintiffs argued that the benefits would 
only total to $6 million and thus the costs outweighed the benefits 
by several orders of magnitude.8 However, in her dissent Justice 
Kagan was of the opinion that the possible benefits could total in 
excess of $80 billion in increased revenue from a cleaner environ-
ment and in the health benefits from not having heavy metals such 
as mercury released into the air.9 Thus, the outcome of this case is 
ambiguous as well. To reiterate the EPA’s ability to fine industry 
was not eliminated, but simply curtailed. The exact measure of 
their reduction in power will reveal itself in future cases dealing 
with regulatory fines of industry.
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According to Susan Fratzke, a policy analyst at the Migration 
Policy Institute in Washington D.C., the only action state govern-
ments can take is to slow down the settlement of the refugees. She 
states that stopping the administration is highly unlikely: “What 
state governments can do is disrupt the finding flow to prevent 
service providers from getting the funds they need to assist refu-
gees in their state.”6 
The Obama Administration’s plan is still in process. This issue has 
escalated to a point where it is one of the main talking points in 
the current presidential debates. The stances candidates will have 
regarding this topic could determine the future of their campaign. 
Will Obama be able to accomplish his goal or will other road-
blocks and potential delays derail his project? Will he be able to 
pass it in time before retiring from office? 
On January 20th, 2016, the Senate voted on a bill that aims to stop the resettlement of  Syrian and Iraqi refugees in the United States. The Democrats managed to put a halt to the bill with a 55-43 vote.1 Since it was a closure vote as needed to 
stop a filibuster, 60 ballots were required in order for the bill to be 
approved. This legislation was previously voted on in the House 
of  Representatives the week following the Paris attacks; it passed 
with a 289-137 vote.2 President Obama prompted this statute in his 
speech after the Paris attacks, in which he claimed that he would be 
moving forward with his plan to accept Syrian refugees.3 Fear of  the 
U.S becoming vulnerable to a Paris-style attack arose because one 
of  the attackers was in the possession of  a fake Syrian passport and 
was posing as a refugee. This prompted Congress to draft the legis-
lation in the hopes of  stopping President Obama’s efforts to accept 
10,000 Syrian refugees into the United States. This matter pitted two 
issues against each other: national security and humanitarian efforts 
to help Syrian civilians. 
The Obama administration stated that it would put forth severe 
screening measures while assessing the refugees’ applications. These 
procedures include: searches of domestic and foreign intelligence 
databases for information on possible terrorist threats, vigorous 
interviews with all applicants and fingerprint and biometric testing. 
The White House issued a statement accompanying these proposed 
courses, declaring that, “the refugees are subject to the highest 
level of security checks of any category of traveler of the United 
States.”4 Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch expressed her support, 
and declared that the U.S screening process would be superior to 
the European one. She is confident that the “significant and robust” 
security measures would be able to detect any threats to the nation.5
Despite attempts to appease any concerns regarding the topic, 
many objected to the proposed strategy. On the one hand, more 
than 23 states attempted to block any possible entrance of Syrian 
refugees. On the other hand, five more states expressed their want 
of more severe security checks. Furthermore, several lawmak-
ers drafted bills to prevent the program from moving forward. 
Although the Refugee Act of 1980 allows state governments to 
give their opinion on whether refugees can be settled inside their 
borders, the Executive Branch is ultimately responsible for admit-
ting, screening and deciding where the refugees are relocated. 
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From high school students to sociologists, many have argued that the affirmative action policies are unfair to students who do not have minority status. In 2008, Abigail Fisher, a denied applicant to the University of  Texas (UT), Austin, went so far as to sue in order to 
declare affirmative action unconstitutional. 
Ms. Fisher filed a lawsuit against UT Austin, arguing that she 
was denied admission because of her race; she is white. The case 
passed through District Court in 2009, when Judge Sam Sparks 
upheld the affirmative action policy. Appellate Court judges later 
affirmed Spark’s decision in a Fifth Circuit panel.1 
The case reached the Supreme Court for the first time in 2011, 
where Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the 
point of the case could be moot, as Abigail Fisher may not have 
been a qualified applicant, regardless of her race. Fisher failed to 
graduate in the top 10% of her high school class. After dissenting 
opinions from Justice Scalia, who believed in eliminating affirma-
tive action policies, and Justice Ginsburg, who upheld affirmative 
action, the case was sent back to the Fifth Circuit.2 The case 
returned to the Supreme Court for a second time on June 29th, 
2015.3 
This is not the first time a case such as this one has reached the 
Supreme Court. In 2003, the court heard the case of Grutter 
v. Bolinger, in which Barbara Grutter, a white applicant to the 
University of Michigan Law School, was denied admission; her 
legal team argued that this decision was made on the basis of race. 
The University of Michigan Law School admits to using race as 
a factor in admissions in order to promote diversity among the 
student body. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of the Law School’s affirmative action policies, because due to the 
individualized review process, no applicant could be denied solely 
on the basis of race. Ultimately, according to Justice O’Connor, 
“the Law School’s race-conscious admissions program does not 
unduly harm non-minority applicants.4
” 
The implications of the Fisher case are significant. If the court 
rules in Fisher’s favor, it could mean the abolishment of affirma-
tive action policies in universities across the United States. This 
could change the diversity and makeup of higher educational 
institutions. And, according to Fisher’s legal team, it would make 
the admissions system a more meritocratic process. With the death 
of Justice Scalia and the recusal of Justice Kagan, who took part 
in the proceedings of the lower court when she was US Solicitor 
general, the remaining seven judges are set to make a decision on 
the case for the second time.5  
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Abortion continues to be a controversial and polarizing issue in the United States. On March 2, 2016, the Supreme Court of  the United States heard Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (No. 15-274), a case regarding the constitutionality of  a Texas abortion law, 
titled “Relating to the regulation of  abortion procedures, providers, 
and facilities; providing penalties.”1 This Texas law, passed in 2013 
and abbreviated as HB2 (Texas House Bill 2), aimed to protect 
women’s health by regulating the setting in which abortions can 
be performed.2,3 Two provisions of  the bill are under dispute. The 
first provision requires that doctors who perform abortions have 
admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of  the clinic at 
which the abortion is performed.4 The second requires facilities that 
provide abortions meet the standards of  an ambulatory surgical 
center, a type of  healthcare facility that is essentially an outpatient 
operating room.5 These provisions would close many clinics that do 
not comply with these standards, leaving no more than ten abortion 
providers open in Texas and severely limiting access to abortion.6,7 
The remaining providers are largely located in urban areas and 
would likely increase the distance many women would have to travel 
to access an abortion.
This law does not ban abortion in Texas, and therefore is con-
sistent with Roe v. Wade at face value, which upheld the consti-
tutional right to an abortion.8 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which 
sets rules regarding what types of restrictions can be placed on 
abortion, is more relevant to this case.9 Using Casey’s “undue bur-
den standard,” the court must determine “if its purpose or effect 
[of the restrictions in Texas] is to place substantial obstacles in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.”10 Simply put, were these provisions intended to prevent 
women from accessing an abortion and did these provisions stop 
women from being able to access an abortion? The aims of Texas 
legislators have been repeatedly argued. Supporters of the law 
assert these provisions are necessary to protect the health of the 
woman seeking an abortion and prevent harm from complica-
tions.11 Opponents, including the American Medical Association, 
stress that these requirements serve no medical purpose and are 
thus needlessly restricting women’s access to abortion.,12,13 The 
intentions of the legislators, or the “purpose” of the law, will 
likely be one major factor under consideration in the case.
The other issue of this case, as expressed in the petition, is whether 
the court can and should consider whether the restrictions not 
only serve, but successfully achieve the stated government interest. 
14The government is allowed to put restrictions on abortion, but 
only when there is a compelling state interest such as protecting 
women’s health.15,16 The aim was to protect women’s health, but 
experts disagree as to whether the provisions achieve this goal. 
If the court decides that they can consider whether or not the 
government interest is successfully achieved, these restrictions may 
qualify as an undue burden.
 
With the recent and unexpected death of Associate Justice 
Antonin Scalia, the court is slightly less polarized, but no less 
divided on the issue of abortion. With only eight justices voting on 
the case, the likely outcome will be 4-4 tie or a 5-3 vote in favor 
of striking down the law. In the case of a tie vote, the lower court 
decision, which upheld the Texas abortion restrictions with one 
exception, will stand but no country wide legal precedent will be 
set.17 
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy is the predicted swing vote.18 
Justice Kennedy’s past opinions on abortion have varied from 
supporting abortion rights and the undue burden test in Casey19 
to restricting access and asserting women’s abortion regrets in 
the partial-birth abortion case Gonzales v. Carhart.20 If the focus 
is whether increasing the distance for women to travel to access 
an abortion is an undue burden, Kennedy may be more likely 
to vote in favor of upholding the provisions as a waiting period 
was deemed not an undue burden in Casey21 and the lower courts 
explained that distance to an abortion provider had not served as a 
barrier in the past in Texas.22 On the other hand, if the focus is on 
whether the restrictions achieve the government’s interest in pro-
tecting women’s health, Kennedy may be more likely to find the 
law unnecessary and unconstitutional. The decision is expected in 
late June 2016.23
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After the San Bernardino terrorist attack in 2015 the FBI obtained a warrant and searched through Syed Rizwan Farook’s Lexus, in which investigators found and confiscated Farook’s iPhone.1   This search was done under the same precedents that allow authorities 
to search through U.S. citizens’ homes.2  The fact that these acts 
are legally and socially permissible illustrates the public’s accep-
tance of  certain invasions of  privacy in the name of  justice and 
security. Unfortunately, this is the end of  any agreeable flow of  
logic between the two sides of  Apple versus FBI. Apple versus 
FBI is a combination of  requests by the FBI to have courts compel 
Apple to assist the Bureau with gaining access to various iPhones, 
the most controversial being Syed Farook’s. The FBI believes its 
request should be accepted on the grounds that this is a national 
security issue, and that there is no law outright prohibiting the court 
from providing them with this relief.3  The responses from Apple 
and its tech-world supporters branch away from this argument, 
pointing towards not only the future of  technological privacy, but 
also the expansion of  the executive branch’s power.4 
Although, as the most controversial example, the San Bernardino 
iPhone has been given the spotlight in the PR battle between 
Apple Inc. and the FBI, there are eight other iPhones to which the 
government is simultaneously requesting access.5  Judge Orenstein 
of New York recently denied one of these requests in his ruling on 
February 29th, providing the issue with a legal analysis that can be 
applied to the San Bernardino iPhone case as well. In his ruling, 
Judge Orenstein argued that there is simply no legal interpretation 
by which compelling Apple to assist the FBI would not be an 
overreach of executive power.6   Until this ruling, the debate has 
basically been a war of words, with both sides supplying the public 
with their own emotionally charged arguments as to why the pub-
lic should be siding with them.
In their request to compel Apple to assist in obtaining access 
to both Syed Farook’s iPhone as well as the iPhone in question 
in Judge Orenstein’s case, the FBI is invoking the All Writs Act 
(AWA).7  Simply put, the AWA gives courts jurisdiction to compel 
a company to assist the authorities with an investigation against its 
will.8 However, the AWA is limited in scope, and it is on the basis 
of these limitations that Judge Orenstein denied the government’s 
motion to require Apple to bypass the passcode security on a 
suspected drug trafficker’s iPhone device. Judge Orenstein argued 
that the issuance of the writ is not “agreeable to the usages and 
principles of the law” because the court order would “accomplish 
something Congress has considered but declined to adopt - albeit 
without explicitly or implicitly prohibiting it…”9  The govern-
ment is therefore attempting to use the AWA as a means for the 
executive branch to achieve a legislative goal, which Congress has 
already considered and rejected.10  Orenstein proposes that the 
FBI, as an extension of the Executive Branch, wants the court to 
“give it authority that Congress chose not to confer”.11  Accepting 
the government’s interpretation of the AWA in this case could set 
a precedent for future violations of the separation of powers.
It is important to note that Congress has not passed legislation on 
issues involving technology and privacy since 1994.12  Assuming 
the San Bernardino iPhone is not the last phone the government 
will need to decrypt in the name of national security, rather than 
subjecting it to various interpretations of AWA, a law written 220 
years ago, this issue must be clarified and resolved by a Congress 
representing the voice of its citizens. Acting in haste and deriving 
precedents from such a crucial and reoccurring issue will only lead 
to further complications down the road.
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1 was a criminal case that cap-
tivated Massachusetts as parents, David and Ginger 
Twitchell, stood trial for involuntary manslaughter 
in the 1986 death of  their two-year-old son, Robyn 
Twitchell. However, this case probed at a question 
beyond guilt or innocence: it was a clash of  cultures as state child 
protection statutes tested the faith of  the church and parental autonomy.2 
Robyn Twitchell passed away from an obstructed bowel, which 
could have been easily treated by traditional medicine. However, 
the Twitchells were practitioners of Christian Science, a religion 
that denounces the use of medical practice and reverts to prayer 
for healing. In the days leading up to his death, Robyn’s parents 
called a Christian Science practitioner and church nurse to attend 
to their son’s ailment and consulted with other Church offi-
cials. The Twitchell investigation was unusually sensitive, as the 
Christian Science Church is headquartered in Boston and top offi-
cials knew about Robyn’s condition before he died.3 First respond-
ers testified that they believed the child had been dead anywhere 
from 45 minutes to three hours before they arrived to the home.4 
After further investigation, the district attorney eventually made 
the decision to charge the parents knowing very well the church’s 
outreach and history in the community. 
The Christian Science Church was outraged by the charges 
brought against the Twitchells. Church officials felt that prose-
cutors were unfairly targeting their belief system. They alleged 
that there was a double standard in regard to children who die in 
medical care versus those who die from failed alternative healing 
measures. This dichotomy is ostensibly unjust; the Constitution 
explicitly grants citizens the right to religious freedom. It should 
logically follow that Robyn’s death was constitutionally protected. 
The Twitchells asserted they were exercising both their parental 
and First Amendment rights. The parents declared they had an 
undeniable interest in shaping their child’s religious upbringing, 
especially given that Robyn was at a developmentally sensitive 
age for such instruction. The parents believed that their religious 
convictions, 1st Amendment and state statutes allowed them to 
forgo conventional medical treatments. Defense lawyers also noted 
that his clients were complaint with Massachusetts “religious 
exemptions” for child-abuse laws, which are specifically meant to 
accommodate religious families. Nonetheless, the jury found it 
particularly difficult to accept the death of a helpless child without 
holding someone responsible, and the Twitchells were found guilty. 
This verdict was consistent with precedent set by Employment 
Division v. Smith, a United States Supreme Court case which held 
that the “free exercise” clause does not allow a person to use reli-
gious reasoning to disobey state statutes.5 The Twitchells were sen-
tenced to ten years of probation and were ordered to periodically 
bring their remaining children to pediatricians.6 While the jury 
and prosecution both expressed their sympathies after the verdict, 
they believed that a line had to be drawn in order to protect chil-
dren’s lives. K. C. Skull, prosecutor of a similar case in Phoenix 
noted, “your right to practice religion is absolutely subservient to 
your child’s right to live.”7
The Twitchells’ convictions were later overturned 6-1 on appeal 
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The justices deter-
mined that the Twitchells had reasonably believed that they could 
rely on spiritual treatment without fear of criminal persecution, 
because Mr. Twitchell was assured by the church and Attorney 
General of this fact.8 This ruling nonetheless meant that the 
state can force parents to provide medical care for their children, 
despite their religious beliefs, and that doing so would not be in 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause 
of the Constitution.9
The precedent set by this case was salient to all law enforcement 
and religious organizations throughout the Commonwealth. 
However, with exemption statutes in place for followers of 
Christian Science and similar religions, the legal waters remain 
murky. Despite the fact that both judicial and legislative action 
have been taken to address this topic, Massachusetts has yet to 
draw an unambiguous line to demarcate the point at which the 
rights of the child outweigh the rights of the parents. 
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T he third major storm in two weeks blasted  a wide swath of  beleaguered New England with more than two feet of  snow Monday, again smashing records and paralyzing travel in hard-hit Boston."1  Anyone residing in Boston last year understands the detri-
mental impact 110 inches of  snowfall has on a city that usually only 
receives an average of  48 inches a year. 
Why was there such an incredible accumulation this past winter 
of 2015? A great numberl of scientists, as well as world leaders, 
have blamed these unusual weather events on global warming and 
climate change. However, these effects are not specific to the New 
England area. The west coast has also witnessed constant droughts 
and a complete lack of rain or snowfall. Moreover, coastal areas 
around the world are affected by increased water levels, which 
cause flooding. Due to the severity of the impact of these weather 
changes in the United States, as well as those seen around the 
world, President Obama is working with the Environmental 
Protection Agency in an attempt to stop or at least slow down the 
rate of climate change that our world is currently at.  
This past December, the Conference of Parties congregated in 
Paris to discuss climate change. This topic attracted close to 
50,000 participants including 25,000 official delegates from gov-
ernment, intergovernmental organizations, UN agencies, NGOS 
and civil societies. In all, 70 countries were represented in Paris.2  
"The purpose of the meetings is to continually assess the nations' 
progress in dealing with climate change and, every so often, 
negotiate agreements and set goals for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions that are the primary drivers of climate change."3  
The main topic of this COP was managing the world’s global tem-
perature. Currently, the global average temperature is ".85°C higher 
than it was in the late 19th century."4  Scientists have concluded that 
"the threshold beyond which there is a much higher risk that dan-
gerous and possibly catastrophic changes in the global environment 
will occur"5  when the Earth’s temperature increases a full 2°C 
President Obama and the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) 
have teamed up to help protect our environment through the 
Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act. The plan is "to cut 
methane emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40-50 percent 
from 2012 levels by 2025."6  The largest source of U.S. carbon 
dioxide emissions comes from fossil fuel-fired power plants, which 
account for 31 percent of the total greenhouse gas emissions.7  
Greenhouse gases are the leading cause as to why Earth's tempera-
ture is rising at an exponential rate. The Earth's temperature has a 
direct correlation to the sea levels. Therefore, when the tempera-
ture rises, sea levels rise. If emissions continue at the rate they are at 
now, "the ocean could rise as much as three or four feet by 2100." 8
The EPA's intention with the Clean Air Act is to create a partner-
ship between states, tribes and the federal government to "imple-
ment air pollution reduction programs to protect public health 
and the environment."9  They have established two different 
types of plans for the federal government to i mplement the Clean 
Power Plan emission guidelines. Each of these plans offers states 
model-trading rules that the states can follow in developing their 
own plans to "capitalize on the flexibility built into the final Clean 
Power Plan.”10  The federal plans will be implemented in any state 
that does not create an adequate plan of their own in time to be 
approved by the deadline. A state can create its own separate plan 
while under the federal plan that has a chance of implementation 
if it adheres to the requirements put in place. There is a rate-based 
and mass-based federal plan for each state that will affect the elec-
tric generating units (EGUs) to help meet carbon dioxide emission 
standards. The point of these models is to gain support from both 
federal and state governments.
The Obama Administration and the EPA have created a plan 
that could lead to change. The problem is with every great plan, 
especially this one, there are critics that disagree with the plan and 
attempt to limit it to the point that it does not succeed. If everyone 
can come to an agreement on how to successfully enforce this act, 
then there is a good possibility of change occurring within the 
United States and the entire globe. 
What is the Plan for Climate Change?
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Justice Antonin Scalia’s unexpected death in early February is a notable loss for the United States Supreme Court and will have numerous political and legal ramifications set to unfold in the upcoming months. Known for his oftentimes controversial and divisive opinions, as well as his unwaver-
ing textual interpretation of  the Constitution, Scalia was a highly 
respected member of  the Court who delivered precedent-setting 
arguments in many landmark cases.1 In one such case, Crawford v. 
Washington, Scalia argued that because the Confrontation Clause of  
the Constitution explicitly states ‘the accused “shall have the right 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him”’, statements made 
to police by witnesses who did not appear in Court proceedings and 
had no prior cross examination, are inadmissible and a violation 
of  a criminal defendant’s right to “confront” witnesses who deliver 
antagonistic testimony.2 A rather intricate analysis of  the word 
“confront” within the context of  the Confrontation Clause thus 
resulted in Scalia’s assertion becoming the law, with the Court over-
turning previous rulings against Crawford, the defendant. Crawford 
v. Washington ultimately exemplifies Scalia’s well-known commitment 
to the precise interpretation of  written law.3
The fact that Justice Scalia’s death occurred in the middle of a 
presidential election year has been a major cause of additional con-
tention among Republicans and Democrats. Although President 
Obama has assured conservatives he will be appointing a new 
justice, he faces several challenges, the most significant being the 
selection of a nominee whom a Republican-controlled Senate 
would be willing to confirm. With the ideological composition of 
the Court in the balance (the new nominee will be the tie-break-
ing vote on a currently evenly split Court), Republicans have a 
huge incentive to delay the confirmation process.4 They cannot 
hold off for too long however, because on March 16th, President 
Obama nominated Merrick B. Garland to fill Scalia’s vacant seat 
on the Court. Garland, who serves as Chief Judge of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, is a moderate known for his 
open-mindedness and “collegiality”, characteristics the president 
was likely hoping Republicans would view favorably.5 Obama’s 
expeditious nomination of Garland is a challenge to Republican 
senators to disregard public pressure and follow through with 
the confirmation process for a judge many view as level-headed 
and affable. In spite of this, Republicans are dead-set on denying 
Garland a hearing and remain steadfast in their decision to delay 
the nomination until the next president takes office in 2016.6
 
Scalia’s death is also having immediate effects that transcend 
presidential politics. On Wednesday, March 2nd the Supreme 
Court “appeared deeply divided” over the implications of a 2013 
Texas law placing extreme restrictions on abortion clinics and 
doctors.7 The four liberal justices on the Court made it apparent 
they would vote against the invasive law. Without Scalia, many 
expected the Supreme Court to deadlock with a 4-4 vote and final 
decision upholding the Texas law and similar pieces of legislation 
in Mississippi and Louisiana. Surprisingly, it seems as though 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who could potentially be the one to cast 
the fifth vote necessary for the abrogation of the Texas law, may 
return the case to the state to gather more information about the 
law’s constitutionality and medical legitimacy. In the event that 
such an investigation leads Kennedy to strike down any portion of 
the law, the resulting 5-3 decision would be the most high-profile 
victory for abortion rights activists since Roe v. Wade and Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey.8  
The Texas abortion case was just one on a full docket of other 
cases for the Supreme Court. Later this year, justices will address 
affirmative action, labor rights, and the scope of presidential 
power in immigration and energy policy. These cases were 
expected to result in 5-4 rulings, but Scalia’s death means tied 4-4 
outcomes are more likely, resulting in the respective lower court 
opinions being upheld.9 As of March 2016, it is uncertain whether 
Republicans will eventually acknowledge Obama’s presidential 
right to appoint Scalia’s successor but, for now, the eight remain-
ing justices on the Supreme Court will continue to fulfill their 
duties and hand down rulings on several cases. All in all, Scalia’s 
vacant seat on the Court is so significant because the person who 
fills it has the potential to dictate the outcomes of some of the 
most critical cases of this generation.
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When Arizona residents voted to add the Arizona Redistricting Commission (ARC) to the state constitution in 2000, Arizonans thought they were going to divorce redistricting from politics.1  According to the Harris v. Arizona 
Redistricting Commission Supreme Court hearing, the ultimate goal of  
the ARC was to obtain judicial preclearance, which it had failed to 
accomplish since the 1960’s, under the Voting Rights Act of  1965 
(VRA).2  The VRA was originally made to curtail Jim Crow vot-
ing laws, but it ended up creating new obligations on other states 
including Arizona. A group of  citizens including Mr. Harris chal-
lenged the newly redrawn ARC districts, claiming that they violated 
the 14th Amendment.3  They charged the ARC with vote dilution 
in the ARC’s creation of  over-populated, white, Republican-leaning 
districts and under-populated, Hispanic, and Democrat-leaning 
districts.4  The Republicans have continually won a majority of  
House seats due to the alleged vote dilution.5   Harris v. ARC has 
asked the Supreme Court to clarify if  intentionally over-populating 
districts to gain a political party advantage denies voters the Equal 
Protection Clause of  the 14th Amendment and if  a favorable 
Justice Department preclearance allows states to ignore the one-per-
son, one-vote principal.6  The current 8 justices have the chance to 
either kick politics out redistricting or re-establish the affirmative 
action voting program the justices struck down in 2013.
The recent precedent in the Supreme Court case of Shelby County v. 
Holder (2013) should make the judicial preclearance defense irrel-
evant because it eliminated (5-4) Section 5 and 4(b) of the VRA.7   
These sections were interpreted to be so outdated that their heavy 
means no longer justified their burden.8  Section 4b had required 
states to obtain judicial preclearance from the federal justice 
department.9  Section 5 froze the process of creating new vot-
ing laws until Section 4b was fulfilled.10  Justices Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito were the majority for Shelby County v. 
Holder and would want to uphold this decision in order to remain 
consistent.11  Section 4b and 5 would remain as forgotten training 
wheels. Justice Ginsberg joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan dissented through an eerie warning that states were 
doomed to repeat forgotten history.12  These justices would want 
to use this case as a springboard to overturn Shelby.
Unfortunately, Harris v. ARC seems to have little potential to boot 
politics out of redistricting to the best of man’s ability. Human 
nature prevents the U.S. from ever having truly unbiased districts 
and there has not been a proven way to have impartial districting 
decisions. Justice Alito brought up in oral arguments that the 
Supreme Court has long ignored the Equal Protection Clause in 
redistricting cases since Reynolds v. Sims,13 meaning that in Justice 
Alto’s opinion, Harris has little chance of persuading the court. 
The stickiest question of Harris v. ARC was the role of partisan-
ship in redistricting. Scalia’s death and assumed lack of time to 
write or voice an opinion in this case may leave this question open 
for future consideration. 
The Justices are poised to answer the ignored another question 
that the plaintiff has posed about the role of race in redistricting. 
In Shelby County, the majority had said that the originally targeted 
counties had continuously met their diversity requirements, so 
these sections of the VRA were no longer necessary. 14 The dissent 
had disagreed. The question was not about politics, but about race. 
The politics argument from the Supreme Court hearing seemed 
very weak.15  Southern states may have to deal with a messy 
dissent as the Justices try to skate around the race question while 
arguing either for or against upholding Shelby County.16  The result 
will either re-install the training wheels on state voting laws or 
maintain the trust that the states have overcome their burden. The 
current volatile climate of U.S. race relations along with Scalia’s 
death may make the court reconsider reestablishing or restating 
some of the stricken VRA sections, or suggest Congress revisit 
these issues.
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While criminal profiling is mainly an investigative tool, FBI profilers have been called upon to testify as expert witnesses at trial. This claim of  expertise is based upon an agent’s experi-ence and training through the FBI’s Behavioral 
Analysis Unit (BAU), which conducts research on criminal behavior 
and develops psychological profiles of  offenders to aid in criminal 
investigations.1 While many law enforcement officers accept pro-
filing as useful, its reliability and validity are a matter of  contention 
amongst police psychologists,2 as the BAU does not always utilize 
the empirical methodology to which scientists are beholden.
This issue was raised in a 2003 detention hearing in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maryland, the Hon. Susan K. 
Gauvey presiding.3 The defendant had been indicted on multiple 
charges related to possession of child pornography.4, 5, 6 Prosecutors 
requested that the defendant be remanded. Under the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984, the question before the court was whether there was 
clear and convincing evidence that denial of bail would be the only 
means by which to ensure public safety.7
The prosecution called Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) James 
Clemente, a criminal profiler with the FBI’s BAU, who testified 
that the defendant was the type of sexual offender likely to reof-
fend, and that the court should therefore remand him.
Judge Gauvey was ultimately unsatisfied by SSA Clemente’s attempts 
to substantiate his claims with empirical evidence, and thus she 
ruled in favor of the defense’s proposed plan to place the defendant 
in his parents’ custody pending trial. The decision was appealed to 
the presiding District Court Judge, Hon. Catherine C. Blake, who 
upheld the ruling. In 2006, Judge Gauvey published her memoran-
dum opinion for the case, in which she reexamined her ruling by 
testing SSA Clemente’s testimony against the Daubert standard.
The Daubert standard for expert witness testimony was estab-
lished by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals.8 The decision set forth stricter standards for eval-
uating the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. Previously, 
judges utilized the Frye standard, which mandated that testimony 
be useful to the trier of fact and that claims be generally accepted 
within the relevant scientific community.9 The Daubert standard 
added four additional provisions: that the scientific expert’s claims 
(1) can and have been tested (are falsifiable), (2) have been subject 
to peer review, (3) possess a known level of reliability and error 
rate, and (4) are subject to maintained standards controlling their 
use. A later Supreme Court ruling in the case of Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael extended the Daubert standard to all expert witnesses.10
Although Judge Gauvey acknowledged that SSA Clemente’s the-
ories were generally accepted within the law enforcement com-
munity, she found his testimony unable to satisfy the additional 
Daubert requirements. When asked whether his risk assessment 
methodology was testable, he admitted that his methods were out-
side of scientific analysis and that the studies he referenced were 
anecdotal. Judge Gauvey described the agent’s answers as “[fail-
ing] to identify anything that could be even remotely construed 
as either testing or validation.”11 SSA Clemente was also unable 
to cite instances in which his sexual offender typology had been 
peer reviewed, as Judge Gauvey did not view oversight by FBI 
supervisors as equivalent to academic peer review. Furthermore, 
SSA Clemente conceded that the FBI has been unable to calculate 
error rates for risk assessments based on offender typology because 
follow-up information on future offenses is rarely available. Lastly, 
Judge Gauvey pointed out that the only control measure mentioned 
by SSA Clemente was oversight by FBI supervisors, which does 
not meet empirical standards. Judge Gauvey opined that because 
SSA Clemente’s claims only satisfied one out of the five Daubert 
requirements, her ruling was the correct decision under the law.
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Public-employee unions are anxious. When the Supreme Court decided to hear the case of  Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, they agreed to tackle two questions: first, whether “agency-shop” arrangements infringe upon individuals’ First Amendment rights, and second, 
whether public-employee unions violate the First Amendment 
rights of  their members by forcing those who do not wish to sup-
port the political causes of  the union to annually and explicitly opt 
out of  contributions to these causes.1  The first question was at the 
center of  debate during oral arguments. 
One must understand the workings of public-employee unions 
in order to make sense of this particular case. An agency-shop is 
an agreement between an employer and a union that allows the 
employer to hire union and non-union employees, and permits 
the union to collect “agency fees.”2  An agency fee is levied on 
members and non-members of unions to cover expenses related 
to collective bargaining. In this case, the employer is the state of 
California, and the union in question is the public schoolteachers’ 
union. Since the decision of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education in 
1977, the Court has held that compulsory agency fees are constitu-
tional if the funds therefrom cover costs associated with collective 
bargaining.3  A union cannot, however, mandate agency fees for 
the purpose of political lobbying.4   Many unions spend a por-
tion of the money from union dues on endorsements of political 
positions that they believe will benefit their workers or even the 
institution of organized labor.
Supporters of public-employee unions contend that since it is 
possible to opt out of the portion of fees that go toward political 
contributions, these mandatory fees do not impinge upon the 
petitioners’ First Amendment rights. This argument is rejected 
by the named petitioner in the case, a California schoolteacher 
named Rebecca Friedrichs, who claims that the collective bar-
gaining process itself is inherently political: “The official you 
put into office is one side and the union is on the other side and 
you’re bargaining for taxpayer money, only the taxpayer doesn’t 
get invited to the table. That’s political, in my opinion.”5  This 
characterization of collective-bargaining appeared to be supported 
by Chief Justice Roberts during oral arguments when he affirmed 
that, “the amount of money that’s going to be allocated to public 
education as opposed to public housing, welfare benefits, that’s 
always a political issue.”6 The petitioners reason that if collective 
bargaining itself is inherently political, then compulsory agency 
fees issued by public employee unions are unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment, since such fees force the petitioner to sup-
port a political process with which they do not agree. As a result, 
in his opening statement, the counsel for the petitioners, Michael 
A. Carver, asked the Court to overturn the “erroneous” judgment 
made in Abood.7  
Although the petitioners remain confident in the validity of their 
First Amendment argument, the respondents point to stare decisis, 
which is a doctrine of precedent that judges cite in order to main-
tain the consistency and validity of the Court’s decisions.8  Counsel 
for the respondents hold that the Court already settled the issue 
of agency fees in Abood.9  However, stare decisis is not a legally 
binding principle, and the Supreme Court does have the ability to 
overrule itself. The respondents also argue that the functionality 
of the teachers union itself would be compromised by free riders 
who opt not to pay for the collective bargaining that benefits 
them.10  During questioning, some justices questioned whether 
this would actually hurt the union, and pointed to other unions 
that do not collect agency fees, yet still operate.
The outcome of the case will revolve around whether the Court 
decides to overturn Abood. If the court finds that collective bar-
gaining is in fact a political activity, and that agency fees uncon-
stitutionally mandate the funding of this activity, then agency fees 
will be scrapped, and agency-shops will be undermined. 
Both sides have cause for concern. The untimely death of Justice 
Scalia has cast doubt on the chances of the petitioners, as he 
seemed ready to strike down agency fees during oral arguments. 
That being said, the fact that stare decisis is not legally binding does 
nothing to calm the nerves of the California Teachers Association. 
This case has been concluded and the decision has been delivered. 
The vote was 4-4, which resulted in the Appellate Court being 
affirmed. Agency fees are still acceptable. Abood is still a good ruling. 
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Donald Trump’s campaign has been fraught with controversy, often about the legality and feasibil-ity of  his policy proposals. From the infamous proposed wall between the United States (US) and Mexico, to his refusal to denounce David Duke, it 
appears everything Trump does will draw both ire and support. The 
most prominent of  these divisive policies is his stance on Islam. 
After calling for a database of  Muslims and monitoring all mosques 
in America, on December 7, 2015 Trump suggested a ban on all 
Muslims. The policy would apply not just to immigrants but also to 
natural born citizens.1
 Trump’s stance on Islamic immigration is particularly extreme not 
because of the restriction of immigration, but how the immigrants 
are restricted by ethnicity and religion, combined with his desire 
to ban current US citizens. In fact, the US has a long history of 
restricting immigrants, with the most obvious precedent being 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of  1889.2  While these laws all banned 
immigrants from individual countries, another case being used as 
a precedent for barring immigrants for their beliefs is Kleindienst v. 
Mandel.3  This court case banned a Belgian author for his support 
of Marxism. Indeed, the rationale in this case was not based on 
an immigrant’s religion, but supporters of Trump’s proposal are 
claiming that this case establishes that a set of beliefs may be used 
to ban individuals from immigrating.4 
One common argument against Trump’s proposal is that the ban 
on Muslims would violate the first amendment. This argument 
holds water, but only for Muslims who are citizens. It would 
be nearly impossible to flat out ban Muslims who are currently 
citizens, as they are a protected class under the first amendment. 
However, not all constitutional rights are granted to non-citizens; 
this means that Trump might be able to partially implement his ban 
constitutionally if he were presidnent, just not to the extent he wishes. 
Despite being legal as a policy, enforcing this prohibition on 
Muslim immigrants would be unfeasible at best. The main reason 
this law would be almost impossible to implement legally is 
the No Religious Test Clause. Clause three of Article VI of the 
constitution, the No Religious Test Clause, only applies to federal 
employees. Arguments have been made that requiring federal 
employees to religiously test immigrants would violate the spirit of 
this clause.5  Additionally, banning Muslims would violate a major 
international law. Ratified by the United Nations in 1966, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not binding 
for the United States but may cause the US to lose many of our 
allies and severely diminish our international influence. 
As a whole, Trump’s ban on Muslims would never be realistic 
and has little legal justification. A ban on Muslim immigrants 
does have some precedent, though mostly in older court cases, 
so whether the Supreme Court desires to hold it up is anyone’s 
guess. Finding a legal justification for requiring federal employees 
to administer religious tests would be nigh impossible. If Trump 
managed to overcome these hurdles, there would be extreme 
consequences on the international stage, making a ban on Muslims 
unlikely to ever be ratified in the US.
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On August 1st 2013, Mark Volman and Howard Kaylan, former members of  Turtles (now incor-porated as Flo & Eddie), filed a class action suit against digital music provider Siriux XM Radio, Inc. in the Los Angeles Superior Court.1  This case 
challenged the universally accepted norm of  broadcasting and copy-
right laws. The legal rights surrounding broadcasting and copyrights 
are long and complicated. This is because the Federal Copyright 
Act of  1976 extends copyright protection only to sound recordings 
made on or after February 15, 1972. Sound recordings that were 
made before this date continue to remain subject to state laws until 
February 16, 2067.2  Broadcasters such as Sirius XM, have taken 
advantage of  this loophole as they play songs recorded before 1972 
without having to pay royalties to the owners of  the recordings.3 
Volman and Kaylan, both recorded multiple songs before 1972 
and only licensed a few distributors to reproduce and distribute 
copies of their work. Sirius XM was not one of those distributors, 
but that didn’t stop Sirius XM from “publically performing” the 
Turtles recordings over the years without paying them royalties. 
While the Federal law did not protect the recordings, the two band 
members argued that they were indeed protected by a combination 
of state laws. The court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs, as it was found that Sirius XM had violated their 
exclusive right to publically perform their recordings.3  This deci-
sion was based on Section 980 of the California Civil Code, which 
states that the author of an original work has exclusive ownership; 
therefore, if anyone wishes to publically perform such recordings 
they must first seek authorization from the recording’s owners.4 
Since the text of the statute is unambiguous, the court relied on 
the plain text meaning rather than looking into legislative history. 
Since this case is the first successful case of its kind, there are 
much larger implications. For instance, in section 980 the mean-
ing of “exclusive ownership” has not been defined. This means 
owners of pre-1972 recordings now have exclusive ownership to 
all types of public performances (i.e. FM broadcasters and digital 
music providers). Where as, post 1972 recordings have exclusive 
ownership only for digital audio transmission. As a result, broad-
casters, nightclubs, and satellite radio providers may not be able 
to play songs by the Beatles, Elvis, the Rolling Stones and many 
more pre-1972 recordings, and that the high risk of liability is 
going to deter innovation and reduce new businesses from enter-
ing the market. 
Due to this class action suit multiple broadcasting companies 
might be liable to pay millions in settlements. However, it is unfair 
to punish these companies for gaps in the law. Therefore, the best 
way to address the anxiety that broadcasters are currently facing 
is for congress to develop a standardized system. Congress should 
repeal the provision in the Copyright Act of 1976 that allows pre-
1972 recordings to be protected by various state laws. Post 1972 
recordings are federalized and federalizing pre-1972 recordings 
will reduce ambiguity and help create uniformity going forward. 
1“Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio – Part Two,” July 13, 2015, 
2Sound Recording Act, Federal Copyright Act. 1976.
3Noah Drake, “Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.: Public Performance Rights for Pre-
1972 Sound Recordings,” California Law Review Circuit Vol. 6 (2015): 61-69, March 15th 2016, 
http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Drake_FloEddie.pdf
4“Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio – Part Two,” July 13, 2015, http://cohornlaw.com/
flo-eddie-inc-v-sirius-xm-radio-part-two/.
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Over the past year, Martin Shkreli, CEO of  Turing Pharmaceuticals, has become “the most hated man in America.” The outlandish 32-year-old former hedge fund manager and entrepreneur acquired this notorious title when he raised the price of  a 
62-year-old drug called Daraprim from $13.50 to $750 per pill.1  
The absence of  drug price regulation in the United States (US) cou-
pled with the lack of  competition made this skyrocketing 5,000% 
price increase on the drug conceivable. This unethical, yet com-
pletely legal decision rekindled a dormant concern surrounding the 
U.S. healthcare industry: ever-increasing pharmaceutical drug prices. 
Shkreli’s actions demonstrate the need for government control, if  
not regulation, over the pharmaceutical industry. 
With an estimated 4.27 billion retail prescriptions to be filled 
across the country in 2016, it is clear that the pharmaceutical 
industry is growing.2  Its growth, however, has coincided with 
a growth in drug prices, which 72% of Americans find unrea-
sonable, especially when compared to the costs of drugs in other 
countries, which are typically 50% cheaper.3  For example, in the 
United Kingdom (UK) Daraprim sells for less than a dollar a 
pill. According to Bloomberg News, “Of about 3,000 brand-name 
medicines, prices more than doubled for 60 products, and at least 
quadrupled for 20 of those, since December 2014.”4  The research 
also revealed many drug prices rose at annual rates over 10%.5  An 
abundance of pharmaceutical mergers has created a lack of com-
petition in the market, and strict patent laws have formed monop-
olies. Consequently, many pharmaceutical companies have been 
able to set their own steep prices without any repercussions.6
  
Some of the blame for these rising costs has been placed 
on research and development (R&D). According to the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America or 
PhRMA, it takes more than 10 years and $2.6 billion to bring a 
drug to market.7  Even then, only 12 percent of drugs actually 
get approved for sale.8  However, for previously developed drugs 
like Daraprim, Len Nichols, a healthcare economist at George 
Mason University, believes R&D is not a convincing justification 
for the price hikes. He stated, “The current revenue doesn’t pay 
for past R&D; it pays for current R&D.”9  Moreover, John Rother, 
chief executive of the National Coalition on Health Care, argues 
R&D is not a valid reason because these costs are “…sunk costs 
and have little to do with pricing.”10  Therefore, R&D is not the 
most plausible explanation for higher drug prices. Rather, they 
believe pharmaceutical companies base the prices of lifesaving 
medications like Stelara, Cycloserine, Isuprel, Nitropress, and 
Doxycycline simply on the highest costs the free market can bear.
 In recent years, the public has taken greater notice of prescription 
drugs’ unjustifiable prices. As a result, pharmaceutical companies 
have already started disclosing payments, providing clinical trial 
results, and offering unanalyzed data to the public.11 However, law-
makers and congressmen are calling for even more transparency, 
specifically through cost transparency bills.12 These bills, which 
have been proposed in several states, including California and 
North Carolina, would make drug companies disclose expendi-
tures. This would, in theory, force drug companies to justify their 
expensive prices.13 Skeptics of this solution have recommended 
alternatives like capping copayments, limiting mergers, price 
controls, and compulsory licensing, which requires companies 
to license drugs to other manufacturers.14 Though, many people 
fear that any proposed bills, regulations, and controls could deter 
pharmaceutical companies from creating new drugs, which would 
leave people without lifesaving medications. 
Without government intervention, people are going to struggle to 
afford their necessary medications. As U.S. Representative Elijah 
Cummings stated, “…it’s like putting a gun to somebody’s head 
and saying you need to pay me this very high price for the drug 
or you die.”15  Unless there is a balanced system for monitoring 
drug prices, there will never be a limit to how much pharmaceu-
tical companies can charge. Therefore, the key to remedying the 
problem will first be reevaluating the regulatory framework set in 
place by the FDA to close various loopholes like closed distribu-
tion.16 Once the system has been rebuilt from the bottom-up, the 
industry will be able to set standards to prevent outrageous price 
hikes like the ones set by Shkreli. Only then will the country be 
able to find an equilibrium that suits the needs of the pharmaceuti-
cal companies, the politicians, and of course, the people.
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Approximately one third of  women in the United States experience physical violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime.1 Some of  these women kill their batterers, and claim self-defense. Proving self-defense can be difficult, and becomes especially complicated 
when it is unclear whether the defendant was in imminent danger. 
U.S. law allows a person accused of  homicide to claim they acted 
in self-defense, “when the act of  killing is necessary or reasonably 
appears to be necessary in order to preserve his own life or to pro-
tect himself  from serious bodily harm.”2 The jury decides whether 
the homicide “reasonably appear[ed] to be necessary,”3 according to 
their estimation of  what “a reasonable man would have done under 
the circumstances.”4 Yet, the jury’s assessment of  a “reasonable” 
response may differ from the battered defendant’s view.  
Many psychologists and domestic violence victim advocates argue 
that expert witnesses should be permitted to present to the jury 
the effects of Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS), “a mental 
disorder that develops…as a result of serious, long-term abuse.”5 
Advocates argue that victims who kill their abusers feel they are 
in imminent danger, urging the jury to consider the defendant’s 
psychological condition and to rule based on what the defendant 
believed to be necessary. In contrast, proponents of the “objective 
standard of criminal responsibility” believe that, if a jury does 
not find the defendant’s fear of immediate bodily harm to be the 
reaction of “a reasonable man,” a self-defense claim cannot be 
justified.6 While a jury ultimately decides the validity of the self-de-
fense justification, each state decides whether expert testimony on 
BWS is admissible in its court. 
In the past, states often decided against the admissibility of expert 
testimony on BWS. In State v. Bess (1968), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court ruled that a jury must decide based on an “objective test,” 
or what they believe to be reasonable, as opposed to a “subjec-
tive exploration” of the defendant’s psyche, or what appeared 
reasonable to the defendant.7 It held that expert testimony on 
psychological factors that made the homicide appear reasonable 
to the defendant was not relevant.8 The Court cited as precedent 
State v. Sikora (1965), which stated that, “criminal blameworthiness 
cannot be judged on a basis that negates free will and excuses the 
offense.”9 Many cases that denied admissibility of expert testimony 
also argued that, since the jury acts as an objective party, its judg-
ment should not be based on the defendant’s view.10 
In 1972, the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives 
created “Federal Rules of Evidence” to standardize the admis-
sibility of evidence in trials in federal jurisdictions. Article VII, 
Rule 702 states that a qualified expert may testify if they meet a 
specific set of criteria: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based 
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on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reli-
able principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied 
the principles and methods to the facts of the case.11
In the 1977 case, Dyas v. United States, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals provided further guidance to states regarding 
the admissibility of expert witnesses by creating a three-pronged 
assessment, now called the Dyas test. According to the test, 
testimony by expert witnesses is admissible if: the subject matter 
is “so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or 
occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman”; “the 
witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that 
field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference 
will probably aid the trier in his search for truth”; and “the state of 
the pertinent art or scientific knowledge” must permit an expert to 
assert a “reasonable opinion.”12 
When considering whether to admit expert testimony on BWS, 
states usually apply principles of Rule 702, the Dyas test, or a state 
version of the Federal Rules of Evidence.13 Many states now allow 
expert witnesses to testify about BWS for cases in which vic-
tims of domestic violence kill their abusers. In 1984, State v. Kelly 
argued against the earlier decision in State v. Bess, determining that 
expert testimony on BWS “is admissible to help establish a claim 
of self-defense in a homicide case.”14 In 1984, Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania v. Stonehouse ruled that trial counsel must present BWS 
to the jury to show that “battered women who kill” often view 
“the final incident that precipitates the killing…as ‘more severe and 
more life-threatening than prior incidents.’”15
Continuing this development, the Court in People v. Humphrey ruled 
that expert testimony is relevant to the jury’s decision, because 
explaining BWS helps jurors understand how a battered woman 
could view homicide as necessary.16 According to the Supreme 
Court of California, it is not jurors’ responsibility to decide 
whether a belief was reasonable, but simply whether the defen-
dant actually believed it was necessary to kill her batterer in order 
to preserve her own life.17 While many states now allow expert 
witnesses to testify about BWS, the question remains as to whether 
the determination of a homicide as self-defense should be based 
on the jurors’ or the defendant’s judgment of what is reasonable 
and necessary.    
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